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Law, Power, and
Knowledge
Professor Theodore Lowi :
John L. Senior Professor of American
Institutions . Cornell University

Professor Jos eph Sox presided over
the final session of the symposium
on Saturda y morning, October 31. On
that occasion a political scientist,
Theodore Lowi gave his view of
the changing role of low in American

political life.
A panel of professors from the
Michigan Low School responded to
Professor Lowi . Th e panel was composed of Theodore J. St. Antoine ,
Joseph L. Sox. E. Philip Sope r, and
Francis A. Allen .

Summary:
In America the law has been a great
source of civic education. Law as
litigation. law as case and controversy, law as dynamic lo cal process
between con tending parties where
ob li gations are made clear and conflicts are defined by lawyers and
judges, law advancing b y successive
approximations has made our
society aware of its problems. Individual citizens learned their
political responsibilities from laws
and. in obeying statutes, came to
believe in their provisions.
This was th e case in the "go lden
age of democracy" that prevailed in
ninet ee nth-century America. In that
"First Republic" the states did all the
real governing. Issues arose out of
local controversies and resulted in
legislation by amateurs that was
clear in its purpose and clear in the
obligation it sought to impose on the
citizen . A profound change in th e
politica l framework within which
legal institutions function was institutionalized during the New Deal
and celebrated with the coming to
power of the Democrats in 1961 .
Since then. w e have been in the " Second Republic," where the national
government has taken on the functions of regulation and redistribution. moving into a coercive relationship to th e citizenry. At the same
time. although Congress is nominally
the source of authority of all policy.
it increasingly has delegated policy
making to the executive .
This concentration of power in the
national government makes consensus considerably harder to
achieve than it was before the New
Deal. While bargaining and compromise were always components of
democratic government. the nature
of comprom ise has ch anged in the

Second Rep ubli c. To understand the
new r e l atio ns hips which prevail
between co mpromis e a nd th e rule of
law. lega l scholars and political
scie nti s ts must examine real laws
a nd the political agreements out of
which they arose.
Three cases of legislation by
Congress in the Second Republic
provide a range of possible types of
compromise and resultant legislation . T he first is The Water Resources Development Act of 1974
wh ich authorized a diverse plethora
of projects delegat ed to th Army
Corps of Engineers. This act required no compromise. since it "did
not involve mutual surrendering of
positions." Instead it created a vast
but temporary coalition of participants who had nothing in common
except for their support of the omnibus bill.
Such logrolling is characterized by
a politics of low visibility. Th e public
is uninformed . In Congress there is
littl e debate on the ge neral moral ,
politi ca l. or fiscal impli cations of the
ac t's provisions and great resistance
to app li cation of a genera l policy
governing public works. Standing
committees or subcommittees with
close rel a tionships to administrative
agencies dominate congressional action on such bills.
Th e Civil Rights Act of 1964,
a lth ough also an omnibus bill.
provides a direct contrast. One pri nciple underla y the entire act: antid iscri mi nation. This broad and
abs tract principle was concrete ly
defined by the bill's severa l titles.
each of which covered a separate
cause of action . This controversia l
bill passed only after its supporters
had agreed to reduction in jurisdiction and weakeni ng of sa nctions.
These compromises were the
resu lt of direct confro ntation
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between interests which shared an
understanding of the types of conduct prohibited by the major titles of
the act but disagreed "as to how
much of each of these principles
should become law ." The bill was
weakened by compromise, but its
principles remained clear. "Citizens
cou ld clearly grasp , without aid of
legal counsel. what new obligations
the 1964 Act sought to impose ."
The Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, which provided for the first
nonemergency wage and price controls in American history, contains
no such principle or specificity. "It
provides no standard by which the
intention of the state could be
fathomed ." It authorizes the President to decide when to, and when
not to. apply controls: he may also
delegate this power to any governmental office he pleases. "This is a
case of compromise by obfuscation"
or "po li cy without law." Such vaguely worded bills undermine the
educationa l function of law. The
politics surrounding them declines
quickly into logrolling . Congress
gives such bills little floor debate ;
agencies administering them look to
interested clientele for help in
developing operating patterns.

In the following excerpt, Professor
Lowi concludes with a description of
the role of lawyers in the Second
Republic and with his proposals for
reform of the procedures and ideologies that result in vapid or dangerous legislation .

Excerpt:
I would posit a general entropic tendency in politics : The
more obfuscated and empty the rules or standards in a
law, the more likely the politics will run down toward
low intensity, low visibility, decentralized and
autonomous elites, and resistance to the introduction of
broader considerations that might produce debates and
rules . Conversely, the clearer and stronger the rules and
standards in the law or bill, the more likely the politics
will be visib le , volatile, and contentious; the more
creative will be the role of debate on the floor of
Congress; the more likely that groups will be in confrontation rather than cooperation; and the more frequently
agencies will confront adversaries, even with arguments
over rules and standards ....
It should now be all too clear how laws and their
politics can so quickly affect knowledge . It should also be
clear how the Second Republic has contributed to the
decline of the education function of both politics and
law . Under the First Republic national government was
not particularly relevant. Its output, though dominated
by the pork barrel and other distributive outputs, was
relatively small. It might also be argued that the political
stability a young and socially vibrant nation got from a
national pork barrel was worth the price paid in moral or
educative irrelevance. However, once the national
government became a modern state and assumed so
many responsibilities to intervene coercively in the
economy and society, it could no longer ignore the moral
and educative implications of its actions. Yet, by and
large. it did ignore them . The two types of policies most
frequently produced by Congress-distributive and
vaguely worded regulatory and redistributive lawsshare one very important attribute: the absence of a rule
or standard of conduct. This explains the similarity of
their politics as well as their low potential for civic
education . .. .
It is in this sort of context where the function of the
lawyer has been transformed by the change from laws
made by state legislatures and state courts to national
policies without law . Lawyers operating by the thousands as legislative and executive staff members are not
officers of the court. They are not involved in adversary
proce_edin~s. They are hardly advocates. They are
funct~onanes, and their legal training is often only of
marginal relevance, except to prove to their employer
they are of sound mind and dependable character .. . .
Lawyers who are functionaries have an important role
to play,_b~t if t~ey are not officers of a court or legislators
or admin1strat1ve rule makers, they are irrelevant to the
historic lawyer's role as lawmaker and educator. It is in
this sense that the Second Republic has revolutionized
the place of the lawyer by changing the character of law
and the place of legislature and courts within the
national scheme. This does not address itself to local
legal institutions performing traditional functions,
though, m_ost like_ly, statistics would confirm the proposition that increasingly smaller proportions of holders of
law degrees ever set foot in court or in any other way
play the traditional role of adversary at law .
Certainly it is the nonadvocacy careers in law that enjoy the highest income and social status. Moreover, those
who want most to use their legal training to make laws
and shape principles into laws tend to have to resort to
marginal careers in public interest law firms or special
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cause groups in such fields as consumer law, environmental law, civil rights or civil liberties litigation, or welfare law. For those who've made their peace with it, the
Second Republic is built on a relatively efficient
administrative process liberalized by procedural
restraints. For those of us not at peace with it, the Second
Republic is a hell of administrative boredom.
The question of what to do about it quickly boils down
to the question of how to reduce at the margins the frequency of distributive and vague regulatory laws while
at the same time increasing, again at the margins, the
proportion of regulatory or redistributive laws that embody some legal integrity. Since it is clear what society
gains from the latter, one important solution is to take the
message to lawmakers and federal judges. We will have
gone a long way toward improving the public realm if we
can just get legislators to feel more uncomfortable about
the stupidities of draftsmanship they call laws. This solution requires everyone else to teach the lawmakers so
they can improve the educative value of their product.
Another approach to reform is through direct public
exposure of bad deeds before they have happened.
Because we can know something about the relationship
between type of compromise, type of law, and type of
politics, we can with good, critical writing head off some
of the worst products. By the time a bill becomes a law
and is handed over to a large agency, it is too late to raise
questions about its lack of educative quality or its
tendency to produce tight little self-defensive coalitions.
Even if these bills cannot be improved, they can be
delayed or prevented from passage if people can be
shown the potential for logrolling and downright corruption. Analysis of this sort might even embolden a
President to veto bills that don't give him enough instructions about how to be faithful in his execution of the
laws. I know from my own limited experience that
members of Congress tend to be more sensitive to
charges of idiocy in draftsmanship (as a dereliction of
duty) than to charges of making unsavory deals. Now that
we see the two are related, our ammunition may be
stronger and more accurate.
Another approach, important mainly in strengthening
the previous two, is playing on the emerging fear of
government but using it as leverage to focus on better
rather than less. A great deal of nonsense has come out of
"conservative," "deregulation," and "free market" parties and publications during the past decade. To oppose
regulation or intervention on principle requires opposition to all the state property laws, banking laws, exchange laws, contract laws, incorporation laws, etc., etc.,
that have made American capitalism what it is. It would
also require opposition to all the zoning laws, construction codes, and municipal laws that have made life so
comfortable for all the suburban middle classes. Cutting
through their silliness is that great element of truth that it
is probably better to leave things unregulated wherever
you can. The beauty of this is that it gives us an argument
for delaying legislation until we can make it clear what
we are legislating for. As long as people were arguing
that the political system will lose legitimacy and society
will fall apart if the legislature doesn't respond to each
demand with a law, a counsel of delay was a counsel of
defeat or a front for selfishness. Now that even the
liberals have seen virtue in the private sphere, delay in
the name of better law will not be suspected as too
selfish or too risky. It was never really plausible in the
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U.S. to favor the free market for its own sake. Now it has
become plausible to accept a freer market as a consequence of the momentary inability to formulate the rule
for properly regulating it. I call this "neo-laissez-faire."
Let me close on a still more drastic idea-deregulation
of the legal profession. Legal historians recognize the
adaptability of the profession as one of the secrets of its
continued importance in the U.S. However, if the work
of the lawyer has increasingly become that of the functionary in the private as well as the public sphere, why
go on pretending it needs to be a licensed profession? A
political scientist is not needed to recognize this as a
myth and to unmask its defense as a cover for state-sponsored control of an occupation by a small elite. Before
this begins to sound arrogant as well as inconsistent with
my entire argument, I want to add quickly that my intention is not to denigrate law or legal training but to permit
the introduction of distinctions within the profession, not
identical to but inspired perhaps by the more stratified
legal professions of Britain and the continental
countries. If we freed the legal profession, it could continue to develop as probably the best graduate training
for public affairs. That is at least where I will continue to
send the students of mine who want careers in public affairs. However, the degree itself is sufficient certification. On the average, lawyers have less need of licensed
certification than practicing public economists. With that
distinction established-call it public service or
administrative law-we could welcome then an even
more severe and state-controlled licensing process for
those lawyers who would seek a career in litigation and
law making, especially leading to judicial positions.
As our Chief Justice has so often pied, we need more
judges, but we don't need lawyers who merely fill
judicial posts or who may know a bit about judicial
procedure. We need more guarantees, which we might
get through licensing, that we have a trained and
democratically recruited elite who have a better sense of
what law is and who have the stature and self-esteem to
confront legislatures and groups with juridical and not
merely judicial opinions. Robert Jackson, one of the most
thoughtful of men ever to serve on the Supreme Court,
once observed that "the Supreme Court is not final
because it is infallible; the Court is infallible because it
is final." I am arguing that we could move a bit closer
toward infallibility if we stratified .the law profession
and developed within it a class of persons truly
dedicated to the development of law for itself. One thing
that has not changed in the Second Republic is the expectation that the federal appellate judiciary will be final.
Statutes with or without legal integrity require agencies
to implement their decisions through court orders and/or
to submit questions of jurisdiction, legality, and constitutionality to normal judicial appeal and review. The
world would quake but not crumble if the courts took
that job seriously, even to the extreme of reviving the
Schechter rule. This would become realistic if judging
were truly a profession.
This last so-called solution evokes a second iron law of
politics: There is an inverse relation between feasibility
and effectiveness. Infeasible as they may be, my modest
proposals at least help to round out the analysis. Like
good law, they may be educative, to this extent-in
politics as in psychiatry the solution to a problem may lie
in the awareness of the problem.

